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VOLUNTARY PLANS TO PREVENT DE FACTO
SEGREGATION IN HOUSING RECEIVE
STATUTORY PROTECTION IN INDIANA
PATRICK H. BUTLERj
Indiana's Civil Rights Commission has long agonized over the prob-
lem of preventing de facto segregation in housing. Shortly after the
first Negro moves into an all white area, the whites depart and the
area again becomes racially segregated. This departure of the white
families is caused as much by their fear of finding themselves in the
minority as by their fear of declining property values.
The Civil Rights Commission felt that Section 608 of the Model
Anti-Discrimination Act, was an instrument which could be used ef-
fectively in solving this problem. It thought that instead of exiting,
the whites in a newly integrated area would take advantage of an op-
portunity to develop a plan to prevent a disproportionate number of
Negroes from moving in. The Model Anti-Discrimination Act, Section
608 provides:
It is not a discriminatory practice for any person subject to this
chapter to adopt and carry out a plan to eliminate or reduce im-
balance with respect to race, color, religion or national origin, if
the plan has been filed with the Commission under regulations
of the Commission and the Commission has not disapproved the
plan.
The Indiana Civil Rights Commission recommended enactment of
a statute that would legalize plans to prevent de facto segregation.
The Indiana Real Estate Association initially opposed the Amend-
ment, apparently because many realtors in small communities felt
that they would have to sell to Negroes and partly out of a habit of
opposing any legislation in this area. Once it was understood that
no one would have to sell to Negroes, this opposition was overcome.
The Negro Real Estate Association felt that the state should enact
a much stronger fair housing law, without exemptions and with pro-
visions for vigorous enforcement.
By one vote, the Indiana Convention of the State National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People opposed the Amendment.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. Uniform Law Commissions Model Act, Discrimination Act § 608 (1966).
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They said it was too close to a quota system, and they feared that it
could be misused by an unsympathetic administration.
In March of 1967, the Governor signed the 1967 Amendment to the
Civil Rights Act. That part of the 1967 Amendment dealing with
de facto segregation in housing provides: that no cease and desist
order shall issue against
... Any person who has engaged in a discriminatory practice pur-
suant to a voluntary plan adopted to prevent or eliminate de facto
segregation if such plan establishes no fixed numbers or percent
for any race, religion or nationality and is found by the Commis-
sion to be reasonably designed to prevent de facto segregation
and consistently followed by persons privy to the plan.2
The regulations to be immediately issued under this statute re-
quire only that the plan be filed with the Commission and thus be-
come a public record. The plans thus filed will be neither approved
nor disapproved by the Commission.
Indiana's failure to enact the provision of the Model Act which
would give the Commission authority to disapprove a plan in ad-
vance is an apparent source of future difficulty. For example, with
such authority to approve or disapprove, such questions as the per-
missible geographic area to be included in a plan would be settled
in advance, and the reasonableness of the plan as an instrument for
preventing de facto desegregation would be tested at the Commission
level prior to attack in court.
Although Indiana's statute specifically outlaws a plan that fixes a
quota for any race, religion or nationality, it is difficult to imagine
a workable plan that is not based upon a numbers concept. If a plan
provides that one-half of the occupants of the area should be of a
given race, religion or nationality, it would be invalid as a quota;
2. Indiana Acts, ch. 276, § 3(1) (1967). The Commission shall have the power
and duty . .
To state its findings of facts after a hearing and, if the Commission finds
a person has engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice, it may cause
to be served on such a person an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from such unlawful discriminatory practices and requiring such per-
son to take further affirmative action as will effectuate the purposes oF this
act. Provided, however, that no cease and desist orders shall be issued against
an owner-occupant with respect to a residential building containing less than
four housing units, nor against any person who has engaged in a discrimina-
tory practice pursuant to a voluntary plan adopted to prevent or eliminate
de facto segregation if such plan establishes no fixed numbers or percent for
any race, religion or nationality and is found by the Commission to be reason-
ably designed to prevent de facto segregation and consistently followed by
persons privy to the plan.
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and if it provides that every other house would be available for sale
to the previously excluded group, it would appear that this would
be just another way of saying the same thing. Without a fixed goal
such as a quota, a party to the plan will not know whether it is con-
sistently followed by others.
The absence of a quota in a plan does not necessarily give it more
protection from constitutional attack. To the extent that one is pre-
cluded from buying a house in an area because of race, etc., his injury
would appear to be the same regardless of whether he offers to buy
after the area has reached the planned quota or after the area has
absorbed what the participants in the plan consider to be a reasonable
number of people of the race, religion, or nationality identical to that
of the would-be buyer.
A possible benefit from the 1967 Amendment is that areas previ-
ously closed to racial, religious, and nationality minorities will be-
come open if the inhabitants of such areas take the initiative and
adopt their plans before there is any penetration of the area by those
previously excluded. Probably such areas will not seek to come under
the Amendment until after its constitutionality has been clealy es-
tablished, because, if the plan is not valid or if the statute is not
constitutional, a participant would be admitting that he was practic-
ing discrimination subjecting himself to the issuance of a cease and
desist order. Evasionary devices, such as taking the house off the mar-
ket, telling the purchaser that there is an offer on the house, or refus-
ing to show it for any number of reasons, do not so clearly show dis-
crimination against the purchaser as a plan sanctioned under the 1967
Amendment.
To make the 1967 Civil Rights Amendment effective, it appears
that the Civil Rights Commission must become more involved with a
plan prior to the stage at which it is challenged. There should be
some definition of the area which a plan can legitimately encompass
and guidelines to help the Commission determine whether a plan is
reasonably designed to prevent or eliminate de facto segregation.
More is required in the way of regulations than merely a filing require-
ment.
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